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Abstract—In multi-hop secondary networks, bidding strategies 
for spectrum auction, route selection and relaying incentives 
should be jointly considered to establish multi-hop 
communication. In this paper, a framework for joint resource 
bidding and tipping is developed where users iteratively revise 
their strategies, which include bidding and incentivizing relays, to 
achieve their Quality of Service (QoS) requirements. A bidding 
language is designed to generalize secondary users’ heterogeneous 
demands for multiple resources and willingness to pay. Then, 
group partitioning-based auction mechanisms are presented to 
exploit the heterogeneity of SU demands in multi-hop secondary 
networks. These mechanisms include primary operator (PO) 
strategies based on static and dynamic partition schemes 
combined with new payment mechanisms to obtain high revenue 
and fairly allocate the resources. The proposed auction schemes 
stimulate the participation of SUs and provide high revenue for 
the PO while maximizing the social welfare. Besides, they satisfy 
the properties of truthfulness, individual rationality and 
computational tractability. Simulation results have shown that 
for highly demanding users the static group scheme achieves 
150% more winners and 3 times higher revenue for the PO 
compared to a scheme without grouping. For lowly demanding 
users, the PO may keep similar revenue with the dynamic scheme 
by lowering 50% the price per channel as the number of winners 
will increase proportionally.1 
Index Terms—Auction mechanism, multi-hop secondary 
network, QoS, relaying incentives, routing.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
New economic models and system architectures have 
emerged to better manage spectrum resources [1], [2]. Among 
these proposals, auction mechanisms have attracted much 
attention as an efficient approach to pricing and resource 
allocation. In spectrum trading markets, a spectrum owner or 
primary operator (PO) leases its idle licensed spectrum bands 
to secondary users (SUs) to obtain profit [3]. As leased 
spectrum usage is fundamentally opportunistic, the SU must 
assess its needs, determine the level of uncertainty that it can 
tolerate and decide whether the spectrum quality is worth its 
price.  
Auction in single-hop networks where SUs request a single 
channel has been covered extensively in the literature and is 
well understood. However with the advent of new 
communication paradigms, an SU may have multi-hop access 
to base stations, access points or other users [4], [5]. The main 
challenge for spectrum trading in multi-hop cognitive 
networks is to establish multi-hop communication using the 
purchased channels under uncertain availability of licensed 
spectrum. Besides, primary user (PU) return has significant 
 
 
impact on the opportunistic usage of licensed spectrum and the 
achievable quality of service (QoS). Therefore, SUs may need 
more than one channel as backup to mitigate these effects and 
keep delay at reasonable levels. The importance of backup 
channels to increase link robustness in cognitive networks is 
addressed in [6]. The impact of the number of channels on sale 
is studied in [7] by considering a three-layer spectrum market 
consisting of the spectrum holders, service provider and end 
users. However, most works on spectrum auction assume that 
one buyer can bid for at most one channel [8] while others [9], 
[10] assume that a buyer can place bids for multiple channels 
but win only one. Few recent works consider combinatorial 
auctions [11] in which buyers may win more than one channel, 
but incur heavy computational overheads. The limitations of 
the previous schemes make them impractical for multi-hop 
networks with buyers bidding for several channels.  
The few works that do consider spectrum auction in multi-
hop networks [12], [13] ignored both the uncertainty of 
channel availability due to PU activity and QoS provisioning. 
They simply focused on providing the best channel allocation 
and pricing according to interference. Besides, the complexity 
of these schemes significantly grows with the number of 
bidders, making them unsuitable for large networks. 
In this paper, we aim to address the above issues. 
Specifically, we study spectrum auctions in multi-hop 
cognitive cellular networks where SUs have different QoS 
requirements in terms of delay and thus, heterogeneous 
valuations and willingness to pay. A framework for joint 
bidding and tipping is developed to encourage users to 
iteratively revise their strategies, which include bidding and 
incentivizing relays, to achieve their QoS requirements. A 
bidding language is designed to generalize heterogeneous SU 
demands for multiple resources. In order to provide high 
revenue to the PO and exploit users’ heterogeneity, static and 
dynamic group partition schemes are developed together with 
new winner selection and payment mechanisms. The concept 
of group buying emerged from Internet services such as 
Groupon [14]. Few works have considered it for spectrum 
allocation [15], [16]. The purpose of these works is to apply 
group buying exclusively to price reduction. However, in 
addition to the above advantage, in our schemes the PO 
performs the grouping and determines the group partition 
strategy based on users’ QoS requirements to fairly allocate 
resources and increase its own revenue. We prove that the 
auction schemes not only provide high revenue for the 
operator but also maximize social welfare and satisfy the 
properties of individual rationality, truthfulness and 
computational efficiency. This last property is highly desirable 
for auctions in multi-hop networks. 
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The main contributions of the paper can be summarized as 
follows. 
1) A network model for multi-hop cognitive cellular 
networks (MC2Ns) that enables analysis of a number of 
performance metrics as a function of the number of purchased 
channels and users´ availability to relay. This model facilitates 
a tractable analysis of the network and provides insights into 
the resources needed to auction based on users´ QoS 
requirements. 
2) A joint bidding and tipping scheme that relies on a new 
bidding language where SUs bid for multiple commodities and 
incentivize users to relay data to achieve their QoS 
requirements. 
3) New group partitioning-based auction mechanisms for 
multi-hop networks. These mechanisms consider static and 
dynamic partition strategies for spectrum allocation to exploit 
the heterogeneous QoS demands of SUs. The groups are 
formed on the basis of resource reusability. In the static 
scheme, the winning groups are chosen to preserve the QoS 
requirements of the highest bidders and the dynamic scheme is 
intended for users with low QoS requirements and a tight 
budget. Hence, the proposed schemes achieve different 
tradeoffs between revenue and fairness. 
4) Development of a reinforcement learning algorithm to 
automatize the bidding process based on users’ previous 
experiences and compare it to the iterative joint bidding and 
tipping scheme.  
Extensive simulations have been carried out to show the 
performance of our schemes and highlight their robustness in 
large networks compared with existing schemes. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The multi-hop 
model is described in Section II. In Section III, the spectrum-
aware routing discovery protocol is characterized. The joint 
bidding and tipping scheme is developed in Section IV. In 
Section V, the group partitioning-based auction schemes are 
presented. Numerical results are given in Section VI. In 
Section VII we discuss related work. Finally, Section VIII 
concludes the paper.                                                  
II. NETWORK MODEL 
A. Secondary Spectrum Market 
We consider a multi-hop cognitive cellular network (MC2N) 
as presented in Fig. 1, where users are uniformly distributed 
across the cell. For modeling purposes, the area of the cell is 
divided into hexagonal subcells of radius r. In each subcell, 
there is, potentially, an SU that will act as a source, relay or 
destination. We remark that this model is intended to support 
the evaluation of the auction schemes presented and its 
complexity is deliberately reduced to offer valuable insights 
into the performance of these schemes without entering into 
unnecessary details.  
Each SU is equipped with one radio capable of switching 
between different channels. We assume that a spectrum owner 
or PO leases its idle channels to SU sources. Due to PU 
activity, there is uncertainty regarding channel availability (PU 
activity is modeled in Section II.B). The SU source will 
transmit uplink by relaying to one of its adjacent SUs (located 
in adjacent subcells) by using the available channels (one 
channel per hop). In the adjacent subcell, there will be a SU 
available to relay with probability p, which depends on 
coverage, battery charge, and willingness to cooperate.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Network model with K-reuse pattern for K = 7. 
 
We assume that SUs have QoS requirements in terms of 
delay. To mitigate the impact of PU return, SUs keep a number 
of frequency channels as backup. Spectrum trading in a multi-
hop secondary network involves decisions by SU sources on 
the number of channels to bid for, route selection and required 
relay availability probability p. In the bidding process, each 
source node submits a compound bid B = {γ, R, bid} to the 
auctioneer (PO) for a number of resources γ = {b, τmax, P} 
needed to transmit through the preferred route R for a 
maximum time interval τmax (QoS requirement), where b 
denotes the number of channels and P the transmission power. 
According to the impossibility theorem [17] we cannot 
simultaneously maximize social welfare and operator revenue. 
Since our focus is on designing auction mechanisms for multi-
hop secondary networks, we aim to maximize social welfare. 
This is a common assumption in the literature when designing 
auction mechanisms for secondary networks [12], [13]. We 
assume that the PO leases its idle channels without causing 
quality degradation to its own services and thus, the PO’s 
revenue is the total payment received from the winning SUs. 
Nevertheless, we are aware that the PO will be interested in 
maximizing its revenue. Consequently, we develop partition 
schemes to provide high revenue to the PO by exploiting the 
heterogeneity of SUs’ demands and willingness to pay. After 
the auctioneer collects all the bids, determines the partition 
strategy (i.e., static or dynamic) that provides the highest 
revenue. Finally, the auctioneer assigns the resources to the 
winning SUs to maximize social welfare.  
Winning sources will pay a price to the auctioneer and 
transmit the traffic to the adjacent user on the route by utilizing 
the purchased resources. In addition, they will pay some 
incentive tip to the relays to encourage them to participate in 
the transmission. Consequently, the SUs’ strategy will consist 
of determining the minimum bid and tip to satisfy their QoS 
requirements. Let us remark that the implementation of the 
multi-hop transmissions does not depend on the partition 
strategy used.  
B. Cognitive Link Availability 
We model the activity of PUs since the transmission of SUs 
on cognitive links depends on channel availability. We assume 
that the PO will lease channels not occupied by any PU to 
avoid degrading the performance of its own licensed users. 
This is a common approach to modeling the interaction 
between the PO and the SUs as a trading process [12], [13].   
To model the link availability in a network with multiple 
channels c, we adopt an M/M/c queuing model as in [6], [18]. 
By modelling arrivals as a Poisson process and call/session 
duration as exponentially distributed, the probability that the 
SU will have b channels available, pb, can be obtained as a 
solution of birth/death equations [6]. Note that the schemes 
presented in this paper are valid for simpler traffic models for 
PU activity, i.e., ON/OFF model [5]. 
If we assume that spectrum monitoring is perfect, the 
probability that a PU will return to a channel currently 
allocated to an SU is denoted by preturn. This is checked at 
every hop of the route and is obtained as in [6]. If a PU returns 
to the channel currently allocated to an SU, it will interrupt the 
transmission and force the SU to try a new option. PU activity 
will have an impact on the number of channels needed by SU 
sources to satisfy their QoS requirements and is considered in 
the route discovery protocol in the following section. For the 
tractability of the problem, we consider that the probability of 
PU return on a channel is the same for every channel and thus, 
all channels are identically desirable. 
C. Tessellation Factor and Scheduling 
We assume users are interested in transmitting with the 
minimum power possible Pi = Pi,min to limit interference and 
power consumption. For simplicity, we assume that all users 
transmit with the same power Pi = P. 
The Shannon capacity on link l when transmitting on 
channel ψ is given by log(1 ( , ))lc SINR P   where 
1
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 is the signal to interference 
noise ratio at any relaying user, 
ijG

 is the channel gain 
between user i and j on channel ψ, nψ is the number of 
concurrent transmissions using that channel, 
ujG

 is the 
channel gain between interfering users u and j on channel ψ 
and χr is the background noise power. The detailed calculus of 
the interference given the geometry of the cell is provided in 
[6]. Then, the capacity on the multi-hop route R is cR = minl∈R 
cl.                
The efficiency of capacity usage when b channels are used 
on the route can be obtained as  
 /R Rc c b .                                      (1) 
The optimization of scheduling in a multi-channel multi-hop 
network is an NP-hard problem [5]. To keep the scheduling 
process simple, we applied a conventional resource reuse 
scheme for cellular networks to our tessellation model, shown 
in Fig. 1, for a resource reuse factor K = 7. The subcell index 
within the cluster indicates the slot allocation, k =1,..., K. Users 
with the same slot index will transmit simultaneously. The 
transmission turn (in a round robin fashion) is given by the slot 
index. When a user is scheduled for transmission, it will 
transmit its own traffic and the relayed traffic. To avoid 
transmission/reception collisions, users can transmit 
simultaneously if they are separated by a distance d > 2dr, 
where dr is the relaying distance between adjacent subcells, 
3rd r  [4] and r is the subcell radius. This constraint is a 
direct consequence of the fact that users are equipped with a 
single radio. In this way, transmissions will be collision-free 
regardless of the adjacent relay or the channel assigned for the 
transmission. This constraint holds for K ≥ 7. To take 
advantage of all available channels and reduce interference in 
the network, the PO will randomly assign a different channel 
to each subcell where there is a winning SU sharing 
transmission slot. The K-scheduling pattern proposed is a 
heuristic that avoids the complexity of re-computing the 
schedule according to PU activity and user availability to 
relay.  
The terminology used in the paper is summarized in Table I. 
 
 
Table I. Notation 
Parameter Definition 
r 
K 
P 
cR, 
R
c   
N 
b  
p 
preturn 
 
pfree 
τ, τmax 
ξm, m   
βm, m  
θm, m  
eC   
pD,m 
Δm 
Vm 
Um 
pricec 
priceq 
δ 
k  
Θk 
S 
Subcell radius 
Reuse pattern 
Transmission power 
Route capacity, efficiency of route capacity usage 
Number of subcells 
Available channels 
Relay availability probability 
Probability of PU return to a channel currently 
allocated to an SU 
Probability of free channel 
Delay, maximum tolerable delay 
Strategy of source m, winning strategy 
Bidding strategy of source m, winning bidding strategy 
Tipping strategy of source m, winning tipping strategy 
Normalized effective route capacity 
Probability that m access the destination 
Scheduling delay 
Valuation function of source m 
Utility function of source m 
Tentative clearing price 
Clearing price 
Price step 
Set of SUs sources in partition k 
Bid of group k 
Number of winning groups 
 
III. SPECTRUM-AWARE ROUTING DISCOVERY PROTOCOL 
This section presents and analyzes a route discovery 
protocol for SUs. By following the K-scheduling pattern, 
collisions between adjacent relays are avoided and thus, we 
focus on discovering the route based on users’ availability to 
relay and PU activity. The analysis of the protocol provides the 
delay and the probability of accessing the destination, both 
crucial metrics for estimating the needed resources to be 
auctioned. 
 
A. Description of the Protocol 
We assume that the PO shares with potential SUs 
information regarding the number of channels b available for 
auction and the channel uncertainty given by preturn. This way 
the SU is released from sensing and any errors it may 
experience. 
Let us assume that in subcell i there is an SU willing to 
transmit to an intended destination by relaying to adjacent 
users. As each user has 6 adjacent subcells, the candidate relay 
may be in any of these subcells w, w = 1,.., 6. We start by 
assuming that the route discovery protocol provides the 
shortest available path, although the protocol admits other 
criteria for relay selection. Then, according to the relay 
priorities given by the distance to the destination, the SU first 
checks the availability of the adjacent user (located in the 
adjacent subcell) in the direction corresponding to the shortest 
distance towards the destination. The user will be available to 
relay with probability p. If this is the case, the SU will transmit 
to the adjacent subcell through a cognitive channel, and this 
transition will occur with probability pw=1. If the user is not 
available, the SU will check the availability of the next 
adjacent user (2nd user), as shown in Fig. 2.  If that user is 
available, the SU will relay to it. This transition will occur 
with probability pw=2. Otherwise, the protocol will continue in 
the same fashion until it checks the last adjacent user (6th user). 
If in the last adjacent subcell there is no user available to relay, 
the route will not be established, which happens with 
probability p0. The same process is repeated at every hop of 
the route. 
As channel availability depends on the activity of the PUs, 
in any system state a PU may return to the channel after the 
transmission to a relay is initiated. This is also illustrated in 
Fig. 2. In this case, the process will be aborted (with 
probability preturn) and the SU will try another channel. 
The relaying probability from subcell i to any adjacent 
subcell j can be obtained by mapping the transmission pair (i,j) 
→ w, as    
1( ) (1 ) ( ),  1,...,6ww b freep b p p p p b w
             (2) 
where pb is the probability that the SU has b channels available  
given in [6], p is the probability that  in  the  adjacent  subcell  
there is a user willing to relay, and pfree is the probability that 
there  will not be a PU return to the channel, pfree = 1 – preturn, 
and preturn is obtained as in [6]. 
The probability that the SU will not be able to transmit to 
any adjacent user is p0(b) = 1 – ( )ww p b , which is 
represented as a transition to an absorbing state nr (no route). 
1st
2nd3
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Fig. 2. State transition probabilities of the Markov model as in (2). 
 
B. Analysis of the Protocol 
We define a relaying probability matrix P(b) = [pij(b)] where 
entry pij(b) indicates the relaying probability from subcell i to j 
when b channels are available. This probability can be 
obtained from (2) by mapping the transmission from subcell i 
to any adjacent subcell j as (i,j) → w. It is worth noticing that 
P also defines the network topology. To analyze the relaying 
process in the network, we map the tessellation scheme into an 
absorbing Markov chain with a set of absorbing states 
{ , }s D nr . These states represent the end of the route when 
the user has reached the destination (e.g., BS, AP, mobile to 
mobile connection) or when no route (nr) is available.  
Then, we reorganize the relaying matrix into an (N + 1) (N 
+ 1) matrix of the form [19]  
*
      
( )
( ) ( )
b
b b
 
  
 
I 0
P
R Q
                           (3) 
where N is the number of subcells, I is an NA  NA diagonal 
unitary matrix corresponding to the number of absorbing 
states, 0 is an NA  (N – NA + 1) all-zero matrix, R is the (N – 
NA + 1)  NA matrix of transition probabilities from transient 
states to absorbing states and Q is the (N – NA + 1)  (N – NA + 
1) matrix of transition probabilities between transient states.  
By defining N = (I – Q)-1, the mean time for the process to 
reach any absorbing state starting from transient state i is [19] 
1 1( ) ( ( ),..., ( )) ( ) ( )A
t
N Nb b b T b T b 

    
1τ (I Q ) 1 N 1    (4) 
when the dwell time for any state i is the same, T = Ti and 1 is 
an (N – NA + 1)   1 column vector of ones. Otherwise, τ = (I – 
Q)-1v = Nv where v is a column vector whose components are 
Ti. 
For the normalized dwell time T = Ti = 1, the entries τi of 
vector τ represent the average number of hops from state i to 
the absorbing state. This expression will be used in the next 
section to define SU valuation.  
The probability that the Markov process starting in a 
transient state i ends up in an absorbing state j is eij, where 
E = [eij] =  (I –  Q)-1R                           (5) 
The probabilities of accessing the destination and no route 
availability are 
[ , ]D nr p p fE                                   (6) 
where f is the vector of probabilities of initial user positions,  
,1 , 1( ,..., )A
t
D D D N Np p  p  and ,1 , 1( ,..., )A
t
nr nr nr N Np p  p . 
C. Multi Session Routing 
When multiple routes are simultaneously active in the 
network there is a probability that two routes will favor 
simultaneously a given subcell while the relay can only be 
available for one route. The remaining routes will look for 
another subcell in accordance with our route discovery 
protocol. This phenomenon can be modelled by modifying the 
relay availability probability p as follows. A subcell used by 
route m1 will be needed also by route m2 with lm2 – 1 relays 
with probability
2( 1) /ml N where lm2 is the route length. If 
M is the number of routes simultaneously active in the 
network, the subcell required by route m1 will not be required 
by any other route with probability 
22 2 11, 
(1 ( 1) / )
M
mm m m
l N . Therefore, if M routes are 
simultaneously active in a network the relay availability 
probability should be modified as 
22 2 11, 
(1 ( 1) / )
M
mm m m
p p l N . By using the new p in 
(2) the same analysis applies. The delay and probability of 
accessing the destination are obtained by (4) and (6), 
respectively. 
By using alternative routes provided by the route discovery 
protocol we can avoid potential route collisions. In addition, in 
a high dense cognitive network we can exploit the frequency 
channels available per subcell by letting different users per 
subcell relay on a different frequency channel simultaneously 
or considering more advanced SU terminals equipped with 
multiple antennas. If there are b channels available in the 
network then route m2 will not be able to use a specific subcell 
only if all b channels are allocated to other routes.  
The probability of having b or more routes attempting to use 
the same subcell is  
2 21 11
i M iM
m m
c
i b
M l l
p
i N N
 
The availability probability p can now be modeled as 
(1 )cp p p .  The available channels would be used as 
backup to avoid collisions as well as PU returns. Even so, if a 
collision occurs, the route will not be established with 
probability p0 as described in Section III.A. For clarity of 
presentation, we have not elaborated this case but the 
extension in this direction is straightforward. 
IV. JOINT BIDDING AND TIPPING SCHEME 
In this section, we first describe the desired economic 
properties of our auction schemes and review some concepts, 
and then present the joint bidding and tipping scheme. The 
auction is a sealed-bid auction with one auctioneer (PO) and 
multiple bidders (SU sources) requesting multiple channels. 
The auction procedure consists of a winner selection process 
(resource allocation rule) and a payment mechanism.  
A. Design Goals 
We assume that bidders are selfish and may lie about their 
valuation to maximize their utility. We define the dominant 
strategy of a player as the one that maximizes the player’s 
utility regardless of what other players’ strategies are. 
Formally, if ξm is the strategy of player m, for any 'm m  , 
and any strategy profile of other players 
mξ , we have 
( , ) ( ', )m m m m m mu u  ξ ξ . If the inequality always holds, 
then ξm is a strongly dominant strategy. Otherwise, it is a 
weakly dominant one.  We aim to design auction schemes that 
can satisfy the following economic requirements: truthfulness, 
individual rationality and computational efficiency, which are 
defined as follows, 
 Truthfulness: An auction is truthful if any player’s true 
valuation is its dominant strategy. This means that given the 
auction rules and the strategy profiles of other players, a 
player cannot improve its utility by submitting a bid 
different from its true bid. Truthfulness is the most desirable 
property as it simplifies player strategies. 
 Individual rationality: An auction is individually rational, 
if no bidder is charged higher than its bid. 
 Computationally efficient: The result of the auction can 
be obtained in polynomial time. 
Let us denote by priceq the clearing price the auctioneer 
charges the SU source per channel. We define the PO’s 
revenue as the total payment received from the winning SUs. 
Since we consider that the PO leases its own idle spectrum 
bands without causing quality degradation to its own services, 
its revenue is always non-negative. As already mentioned, due 
to the impossibility theorem [17] we cannot simultaneously 
maximize social welfare and operator revenue. Therefore, our 
auction schemes are designed to maximize social welfare and 
provide high revenue to the PO by incorporating partition 
schemes that exploit the heterogeneity of SU demands.  
B. Joint Bidding and Tipping Scheme 
We assume that all sources bid for resources 
simultaneously. We define a new bidding language for multi-
hop secondary networks which enables each SU source m to 
submit a compound bid to the auctioneer as Bm={γm, Rm, bidm} 
where γm are the resources to auction, Rm is the transmission 
route and bidm is the bid amount. In our auction schemes, the 
resources γm are given by γm={bm, τmax,m, Pm}, where bm are the 
channels needed during maximum τmax,m slots (QoS 
requirement) when transmitting with power Pm = P. 
The source node determines the bid based on its valuation of 
the resources and willingness to pay. Besides, it also provides 
a tip to encourage the relays to cooperate and thus, reduce the 
delay. We define the strategy profile of source m as, 
( , )m m m    where βm indicates the percentage of the 
valuation that m is willing to pay per channel and θm is the 
percentage offered as a tip per hop. 
The PO is interested in the optimum allocation of resources 
so SUs will achieve good performance and, thus, be able to 
offer high bids.  
The valuation function of bidder m depends on the number 
of demanded channels bm and the relay availability probability 
p. We formulate it as 
,,
( , )
( , )
( , )
e m m
m m m
m m t m
C b p
V b p
b p P

 
                    (7) 
where, 
 αm is the private valuation of resources, 0 ≤ αm ≤ 1, which 
shows the heterogeneity of users’ valuations. We set αm = 1 / 
τmax,m  to model the relation between highly demanding users 
and high valuation. 
 
,e mC  is the effective route capacity obtained as 
, , me m D m R
C p c  , where ,D mp  is the probability of accessing 
the destination given by (6) and 
mR
c the efficiency of route 
capacity usage2 (1). 
  Δm denotes the scheduling delay of route m and is obtained 
as Δi (bm, p) = Kτm(bm, p)  where τm is given by (4). 
  The overall power consumption of route m is Pt,m = Pτm.  
The previous definition of valuation, in terms of throughput 
per unit power, has been used in multi-hop wireless networks 
to analyze different trade-offs [32], [33]. 
The bid offered is a percentage of the valuation of the 
resources when bm channels are used, 
( , ) ( , )m m m m m mbid b p b V b p                        (8) 
where βm indicates the percentage of the gain that SU m is 
willing to pay per channel. The PO will ask for a price q that 
represents the minimum payment it is willing to accept for 
selling the channels. This will result in a percentage of the 
SU´s gain, βm,q.  
The overall tip that source m will pay to encourage users to 
relay with probability p is  
( , ) ( , )m m m m m mtip b p V b p                        (9) 
where θm indicates the percentage of the valuation SU m will 
offer as a tip per hop and τm is the number of hops on the route 
(4). Note that a high valuation αm will result in a higher bid and 
tip. 
 Following a particular strategy ( , )m m m   , each SU m 
determines the number of channels bm and p to satisfy its QoS 
requirements by solving the following optimization problem, 
,
max,
maximize    ( , ) = ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
subject to    ( , )
                   1                                             (10)
                   0 1  
m
m m m m m m m m
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where τmax,m is the QoS constraint given in terms of delay and c 
are the total channels in the cellular network, n of which are 
occupied by PUs. This optimization provides the optimum 
number of channels bm and the optimum availability 
probability p such that the SU obtains the maximum utility for 
a given value of βm and θm. The valuation function defined by 
 
2 The SUs calculate an estimation of their link capacity [6] considering that 
in the worst case there will be N/K secondary users transmitting in the same 
slot on any of the b available channels, where N is the number of subcells and 
K the resource reuse factor. Due to the symmetry of the scenario, the same 
capacity is assumed per hop. All SUs estimate the capacity in the same way 
and thus, they bid under the same conditions. 
(7) is concave and, thus, cost and utility functions are concave 
as well. Problem (10) can be solved by introducing a penalty 
term into the utility when the first constraint is violated. Then, 
the solution will favor the values of bm and p such that K · 
τm(bm, p)   τmax. The equivalent optimization problem can be 
solved efficiently by numerical methods [30]. 
 Winner Selection: After the auctioneer receives all bids, it 
sorts them in decreasing order {bidm}, m = 1, …, N and selects 
the M highest bidders as potential winners. Since the K-reuse 
pattern provides full reusability of resources and eliminates 
collision, the auctioneer selects the potential winners based 
exclusively on their bids. Then, the auctioneer announces the 
tentative clearing price (per channel), priceq, and allows all 
users to revise their strategies and submit a new bid in the next 
iteration, as shown in Algorithm 1. To encourage truthfulness 
and obtain high revenue, the tentative clearing price in each 
iteration t is increased as pricec(t+1) = priceq(t) + δ·t, where δ 
is a constant. The auction iterates until the difference in the 
clearing price, |pricec(t) – pricec(t-1)| < ε. When the auction 
finishes, the users whose bids are higher than the clearing price 
are the winners. To control the communication overhead, the 
PO is in charge of deciding the number of winners M, the step 
price δ and the iterations T needed to satisfy its expected 
revenue as a function of N. 
Payment Mechanism: We designed the payment mechanism 
to be relatively independent of winner selection to ensure 
truthfulness. We choose the highest losing bid as the clearing 
price, priceq. In our iterative auction, this is highest bid from 
the bidder who lost in all previous iterations, as given in 
Algorithm 1.  
Revision of strategy: As a result of the auction in each 
iteration, the SU m revises its strategy 
( 1) ( ( 1), ( 1))m m mt t t       and obtains b
*(t+1) and 
p*(t+1) by solving (10). The strategy is updated as follows:  
 Based on the tentative clearing price, ( 1)cprice t  , the 
new percentage of valuation offered per channel is given by 
(8),  
*( 1) ( 1) / ( ) ( )m c m mt price t b t V t    .             (11) 
 Since p*(t) is the required relay availability probability, let us 
denote by 1 – p*(t) the utilization of the relay, defined as the 
probability that the relay is transmitting its own traffic. The 
percentage of valuation offered as a tip to compensate the 
user for relaying is set to 
 
*( 1) 1 ( )m t p t    .                        (12) 
After revising the strategy, the optimization in (10) is solved 
and the SU m offers a new bid and tip, respectively, as 
*
* *
( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1)
( 1) ( 1) ( ( 1), ( 1)) ( 1)
m m m m
m m m m m
bid t t b t V t
tip t t b t p t V t

 
      
       
 
If the SU cannot pay the price asked for the PO, it will not 
get the resources, Um = 0. Otherwise, the user will win with 
utility 
* *( , ) m m mU b p and strategy m . This auction scheme 
maximizes social welfare as it allocates resources to those who 
value them the most. 
The potential efficiency of the joint bidding and tipping 
scheme reflects the probability that winners’ demands will be 
satisfied. This can be characterized from the average 
probability of accessing the destination, 
JBiT Dp  , given by 
(6). The potential efficiency of each strategy is:  
'
( , )                         (13a)
( , )                         (13b)
bid D
p
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Algorithm 1 Iterative joint bidding and tipping (i-JBiT) 
1. Initialize: t = 1, pricec(1) = 0, priceq(1) = 0, max_loser = bidM+1 
2. Store in  max_loser the highest bid from the user who loses in all 
previous iterations 
3. Repeat 
4.    Each user submits a bid to the auctioneer 
5.    Let {bidm}, m = 1,…, N be the sorted array of bids 
6.    Find the tentative winner bids from {bidm} / bidm ≥ priceq 
7.    Set the clearing price to priceq(t) = max_loser 
8.    t = t + 1 
9.    Update the tentative clearing price, pricec(t) = priceq(t-1) + c·t 
10.    Each user revises the bid and tip by solving (10) with  βm(t+1) 
and θm(t+1) given by (11) and (12), respectively 
11. Until |pricec(t) - pricec(t-1)|< ε    
12. priceq = max_loser 
13. End 
14. Return winners and clearing price priceq 
C. Economic Properties and Time Complexity 
The proofs of the properties truthfulness, individual 
rationality and computational efficiency are provided in 
Appendix A. 
Theorem 1: The i-JBiT scheme is truthful such that the SU 
m’s best strategy is ( , )m m m   . 
Theorem 2: The i-JBiT scheme is individually rational since 
SU m will not pay more than its true valuation, bidm ≥ priceq. 
Theorem 3: The i-JBiT scheme is computationally efficient 
since the auction is solved in polynomial time.  
V. GROUP PARTITIONING-BASED AUCTION DESIGN 
The concept of group-buying auctions (e.g., Groupon, 
Google Offers) is widespread in the context of Internet 
services [14], [20]. The idea behind online group buying is to 
recruit enough users to generate a volume of orders large 
enough to motivate lower transaction prices. These works 
differ from the group buying schemes applied to spectrum 
sharing in that there may be more than one item to sell 
(channel) and that resources can be shared among different 
users (spectrum reusability). In this section, we define static 
and dynamic partition schemes to increase SU´s valuation by 
extending the concept of Internet group buying to spectrum 
trading in multi-hop networks.  
When there is a large number of SU sources bidding for 
resources at the same time, the PO will reuse the resources to 
serve the highest bidders. However, high resource reusability 
implies longer scheduling times, which will degrade SU QoS 
and its valuation. To deal with this issue, in the sequel we 
present static and dynamic partition strategies at the PO to 
group SUs sources and benefit from the heterogeneity of their 
requirements. Recall that once the winning SUs are determined 
the multi-hop transmissions are implemented as explained in 
Section II.C and III.A. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A. Static Group Partitioning Scheme  
We assume that after the auctioneer receives all bids, it will 
partition the bidders into K groups, as shown in Fig. 3, 
following the K-reuse pattern introduced in Section II.C (Fig. 
1). We call this scheme an sgroup scheme. The partition is 
denoted as 
1 2{ , ,..., ,..., }K k K  , where k is the 
index of the k-th partition and k the set of bidders in that 
partition. The cardinality of any partition is 
/ 3 ( 2 ) /k N K R R r K     , where N is the number of 
subcells, R the radius of the macrocell and r the radius of the 
subcells. The users of a winning partition will transmit 
simultaneously in the same slot k to their adjacent subcells on 
the way to their respective destinations. This scheme reduces 
the number of winning groups to S, S ≤ K and the number of 
winners to those belonging to the winning groups. 
Following the i-JBiT scheme, each SU source m chooses its 
strategy ( , )m m m    and determines the number of channels 
bm and p to satisfy its QoS by (10). Then, all users 
simultaneously submit their sealed bids to the auctioneer. After 
receiving all bids, the auctioneer will apply the previously 
described static grouping scheme and calculate the bid per 
group. 
We define the bid of a group as the sum of all SU bids in 
that group. We denote by 
k  the bid of group k  and by 
bidm,k  the bid of a particular user m within that group. Then, 
we have  
,
k
k m km
bid

                             (14) 
where bidm,k is given by (8) for km . 
We denote by τmax,k the maximum delay that the users in 
group k can tolerate, τmax,k = min{τmax,m},  where τmax,m is the 
QoS requirement of user m, km .  
Winner Selection: The auctioneer sorts the group bids in 
descending order and forms the set {
s }, s = 1,…, K. Then, 
the auctioneer selects as potential winners the S, S ≤ K, highest 
group bids such that τmax,S ≤ min{τmax,s-1}, s = 1,…, S and 
sm .  
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Fig. 3. Static group-bidding scheme based on K-reuse pattern. 
 
Payment Mechanism: The payment mechanism consists of 
two steps: determination of the price for each winning group 
and for each SU. The clearing price of a winning group priceq 
is the highest group bid from the group that lost in all previous 
iterations, as given in Algorithm 2. As before, to encourage 
truthfulness and obtain high revenue, the tentative clearing 
price in each iteration t is sequentially increased as pricec(t+1) 
= priceq(t) + δ·t. 
Given the winning group clearing price defined as above, 
the price a winning SU m in group s must pay is proportional 
to its bid, 
,
,
m s
m s c
s
bid
price price

                    (15) 
Revision of strategy: The auctioneer allows all SUs to revise 
their strategies ( 1) ( ( 1), ( 1))m m mt t t       and submit a 
new bid and tip as a result of (10). Strategy revision follows i-
JBiT, where βm (t + 1) is now obtained by (11) for pricem,s, and 
θm (t + 1) by (12).  
Once the i-JBiT algorithm converges to the clearing price, 
each source m belonging to a winning group S will transmit to 
its intended destination on the selected route using the 
resources purchased. Relays (compensated by tips) will 
forward the traffic of the winning bidders following the K-
scheduling pattern. In this scheme, the number of winning 
groups S is limited by the QoS requirements of the highest 
bidders. This thus reduces the scheduling time by a factor of 
S/K and is a fair scheme for users with more restrictive QoS 
requirements as they will be eager to pay more and this will 
increase their chances of winning the auction. 
 
Algorithm 2 Iterative joint bidding and tipping sgroup scheme (sgroup) 
1. Initialize: t = 1, pricec(1) = 0, priceq(1) = 0 
2. Store in  max_group_loser the highest group bid from the group which 
lost in all previous iterations 
3. Repeat 
4.    Each user submits a bid to the auctioneer 
5.    The auctioneer groups the users following the K-reuse pattern and 
obtains the group bids Θk from (14) and the     
  maximum tolerable delay per group, τmax,k =  min{τmax,m} 
6.    Let {Θk}, k = 1,…, K be the sorted array of group bids 
7.    Find the S highest group bids from {Θk} / S·τm ≤ min{τmax,s},  s  = 1,…, 
S 
8.    Set the clearing price to priceq(t) = max_group_loser 
9.    t = t + 1 
10.    Update the tentative clearing price, pricec(t) = priceq(t–1) + c·t 
11.    Obtain the price per user, pricem,s by (15) 
12.    Each user revises the bid and tip by solving (10) with βm(t+1)  and 
θm(t+1) given by (11) and (12), respectively 
13. Until |pricec(t) – pricec(t–1)|< ε    
14. priceq = max_group_loser 
15. Obtain the price per user, pricem,s  by (15) 
16. End 
17. Return S winner groups and the clearing price per user pricem,s 
 
The PO can create new partitions by changing r and K, 
1 2( , ) { , ,..., }K Kr K   . The effects of these 
parameters on network performance are the following: 
 For constant K and smaller r, the number of members per 
group increases. The delay per route increases with the 
number of hops and thus, the users will need to pay a higher 
tip as the route will be longer. 
 For constant r and changing K, the number of hops is fixed. 
The scheduling duration increases with K. The interference 
and the number of users per group decreases as K increases.  
Theorem 4: The i-JBiT with sgroup partition is truthful, 
individually rational and computationally efficient. 
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix B.                       ■ 
B. Dynamic Group Partitioning Scheme 
In this section, we present a dynamic group partitioning 
scheme (denoted as dgroup scheme) that exploits the dynamic 
arrival of bidders to the network. The auctioneer allows users 
to join forces within a given time frame T to get volume 
discounts. This scheme is intended for users with low QoS 
requirements and a tight budget.  
The auction scheme consists of two steps. In the first step, 
the PO sets its price curve and the auction period T. As before, 
we denote the clearing price in time t as pricec(t). This 
information is available to the bidders to motivate additional 
buyers. In the second step, the bidders place bids one by one 
according to their arrival times. We assume that, when a bidder 
arrives, it will bid immediately if the resources are considered 
to be worth the asking price. The bidding and arrival times are 
therefore the same.  
Winner Selection: Let us assume that index m, m = 1,…, N 
denotes the index of the SU source and also the sequence 
number according to its arrival time. To bid successfully, each 
bidder m must offer a bid bidm ≥ pricec (tm). The user obtains 
its strategy from (11) for βm ≥ βm,c. Although the price is given, 
the optimization in (10) is solved iteratively following the i-
JBiT to obtain the bid and tip. After this point, the user will 
wait in the queue until the auction finishes. Otherwise, it will 
leave the auction immediately and forever. The auction will 
end after time T. When the auction ends, the users whose bids 
are higher than pricec(T)  will be the winners. Note that, as the 
price decreases in time, a winner in time tm will also be a final 
winner. 
Payment Mechanism: The pricing function is defined as 
follows. The PO will reuse the resources among the SUs 
following the K-reuse pattern and let the users transmit in the 
same slot to share expenses. As the number of users increases, 
the price per user will decrease and, consequently, users will 
benefit from an increasing number of bidders. The price will 
also be influenced by the uncertainty of resource availability 
during the auction period T given by the probability preturn(T) 
[6]. The higher the uncertainty, the lower the price charged for 
the resources will be. Based on the description above, the 
average price pricec(tm) when source m bids at time tm can be 
defined as 
( ) (1) ( ),  
( )
mt
c m c m free m
S m
K
price t price b e p T t T
n t
     (16) 
where pricec(1) is the initial price of the resources at t = 1, bm 
is the number of channels that m bids for, nS(tm) is the average 
number of SUs at time tm, and pfree(T) = 1 – preturn(T).  
If we assume that bidm ≥ pricec(tm) with probability pm, the 
equivalent rate at which SUs attempt to access the spectrum is 
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Fig. 4. Average τ versus p for different values of b 
where τ defined by (4). 
 
λeq = λS · pm. Then, the average number of SUs in the network 
at time tm, nS(tm), can be obtained as [19] 
0 0
( )
( ) ( )  
!
eq m
m m
teq m
S m m
t
n t p t e



 

 


 
          (17) 
where pς(tm) is the probability of ς arrivals until time instant tm.  
The final price, pricec(T), is obtained when the auction is 
completed. The winning bidders will transmit to their intended 
destination and relays (compensated by tips) will forward their 
traffic following the K-scheduling pattern. The average queue 
waiting time, wf, can be ignored, as wf  << K · τm.  
 
Algorithm 3 Iterative joint bidding and tipping dgroup scheme (dgroup) 
1. Initialize: number of winners nS  =  0 
       The auctioneer provides the initial clearing price pricec(1), and duration 
of the auction T 
2. Repeat 
3.    A new user m arrives at the network at time tm and observes the price 
pricec(tm)  
4.    Each user revises their bid and tip by solving (10) with βm(t+1) and 
θm(t+1) given by (11) and (12), respectively.  
5.    If bidm ≥ pricec (tm) then  
6.         Update winners by nS =  nS +1 
7.    end 
8.    tm = tm +1; 
9.    Update the tentative clearing price, pricec(tm) as in (16) 
10. Until tm < T    
11. Obtain the final clearing price, pricec(T) as in (16) 
12. End 
13. Return nf   winners and the clearing price pricec(T) 
 
Theorem 5: The i-JBiT with dgroup partition is truthful, 
individually rational and computationally efficient. 
Proof: The proof is shown in Appendix C.                        ■ 
Both the static and dynamic partition schemes allow the 
auctioneer to exploit the heterogeneity of SUs in terms of QoS 
requirements and willingness to pay in order to increase the 
operator’s revenue and maximize social welfare. 
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS 
We conducted Matlab simulations to verify the theoretical 
analysis, evaluate the performance of our proposed auction 
schemes and compare them with existing schemes. The 
network considered is shown in Fig. 1, where the radius of the 
macrocell is R = 1000 m, H = 4 and P = 0.75 W. The path loss 
exponent is α = 2 and the noise power is Nr = 10-4 W [6]. We 
assume that in each subcell there is an SU source willing to 
transmit to the BS or destination user. The density of 
destinations is set to 0.1. Besides, the source will be available 
to relay other users’ data with probability p. We consider that 
there are c = 10 channels in total in the cellular network, n of 
which are occupied by PUs, and b potentially available 
channels for SUs. The available channels during a given 
transmission slot are randomly allocated to the SUs sharing 
that slot, according to the K-reuse pattern. Monte Carlo 
simulations were run and the results were averaged over 100 
iterations. 
A. Joint Bidding and Tipping  
The  simultaneous  impact  of b and p on average  delay   
is shown in Fig. 4. Note that a QoS requirement given by τmax 
can be achieved  by  different combinations of  p and b. In 
particular, the higher b the lower p is needed to achieve the 
same delay, and vice versa. The minimum and maximum delay 
per user observed in this network was 1 and 7, respectively. 
This gap will be reflected in the QoS requirements. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the following, we assume K = 7 and users’ QoS 
requirement τmax  randomly varying between [7, 49].  The joint 
bidding and tipping scheme is run for T =25 iterations until the 
trading price is reached, |pricec(t) – pricec(t-1)| < ε. The price 
step is δ = 10-3 and the initial value of βm  and  θm is set to 0.05. 
The revision of the bid and tip in each iteration is shown in 
Fig. 5, together with the tentative clearing price. We can see 
that the bid increases in each iteration to follow the tentative 
clearing price. To keep raising the bid, the user will moderate 
the number of channels it bids for, as shown in Fig. 6. In 
addition, to continue to meet the QoS requirement, the user 
will request a higher relay availability probability p. As a 
result, the tip will iteratively decrease, as shown in Fig. 5. Note 
that the percentage of the valuation offered as a tip is  θ = 1– p. 
 In Fig. 6, the optimum number of channels b* is shown for 
different p* as a result of solving (10) by i-JBiT. We can see 
that for higher p*, fewer channels b* are needed to satisfy the 
QoS requirement, as previously discussed. The average user 
utility is shown in Fig. 7 versus the iteration index for different 
relay availability probabilities p. By increasing p, a higher 
utility is obtained as the user’s valuation increases. Since the i-
JBiT algorithm iteratively updates the bid and tip, the utility 
oscillates during the process. 
In Fig. 8, the revenue of the auctioneer is presented versus 
the iteration index. The revenue increases with the iteration 
index and p. However, for p > 0.7, the gain is not significant as 
the user needs fewer channels. 
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B. Group Partitioning Schemes 
We consider three scenarios to show the performance of the 
auction when the PO utilizes the sgroup partition scheme. In 
each scenario, we assume that the QoS requirements of the 
SUs τmax vary randomly in [3, 21], [5, 35] and [7, 49], 
respectively.  
The revenue of the PO is shown in Fig. 9 for the previous 
scenarios versus the number of winning groups, S. The highest 
revenue is obtained for the first scenario when S = 2. This 
scenario is the one with the most restrictive QoS requirements. 
As the QoS requirements become more relaxed (scenario 1 → 
3), the optimum S increases since users can tolerate higher 
delays. We can also see that the PO revenue is about 3 times 
higher than in the scheme without groups (S = 7) in the most 
restrictive case. In scenario 3, even though the users can 
tolerate higher delays, the PO revenue is twice as high as in the 
case without grouping. The number of winners in each case is 
shown in Fig. 10. In the first scenario, the sgroup scheme 
provides 150% more winners than the no-group scheme and 
40% more than in scenario 3. It is worth noting that although 
the number of winners in scenario 1 is the lowest, the PO 
obtains the highest revenue as the users place high value on the 
resources. To show the performance of the dgroup partition 
scheme, we considered three additional scenarios. As this 
scheme is intended to increase the revenue of the PO when 
users have low QoS requirements, in the new scenarios we 
assume that the QoS requirements τmax vary randomly between 
[9,63], [11,77] and [13,91]. The final clearing price pricec(T) is 
set to a fraction of the final clearing price obtained in the 
scheme without groups for a fair comparison. In Fig. 11, the 
number of winners is shown for the different scenarios. We 
can see that by reducing the price per channel by 50%, the 
number of winners increases by up to 45% in the low demand 
scenarios, with consequent increase in social welfare. The 
revenue obtained by the PO is shown in Fig. 12 for the same 
scenarios. When the clearing price is reduced by 25%, the 
increased number of winners compensates the price reduction 
and the revenue obtained is even higher than in the scheme 
without groups.  
The initial values of βm and θm have impact on the 
convergence speed of the bidding and tipping process. The PO 
can adjust the speed by changing the price step δ. In order to 
keep the utility Um ≥ 0, we need βm = θm ≤ 1/(bm + τm). For the 
range of QoS requirements considered, βm = θm ≤ 0.25 when τm 
= 3 and b = 1, and βm = θm ≤ 0.01 when τm = 91 and b = 9. Our 
simulations suggest that if the initial value of βm and θm  is set 
to 0.25, similar convergence speed as in the current case with 
0.05 is achieved. However, if we change the initial value of βm 
and θm to 0.01 similar convergence speed can be obtained 
decreasing δ to 1/10 times of its previous value. 
C. Comparison with other schemes 
To the best of our knowledge, our auction schemes are the 
first to consider bidding and tipping strategies as well as PO 
partition strategies to exploit heterogeneous QoS requirements 
in multi-hop secondary networks. As the previous section 
already provides insights into PO gains obtained with and 
without partition schemes, here we focus on comparing our 
model, which integrates route discovery and the i-JBiT 
algorithm, with other approaches.  
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Fig. 11. Number of winners in dgroup scheme.                     Fig. 12. PO revenue in dgroup scheme.                           Fig. 13. Bidding efficiency comparison.  
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Figure 13 shows the potential efficiency of the proposed 
bidding scheme compared with the scheme in [13], which 
greedily assigns channels to different links. Recall that in our 
bidding scheme users estimate the resources needed and select 
the best route thanks to the route discovery protocol.  We can 
see that our scheme significantly outperforms the greedy 
scheme as it considers the existence of multiple possible routes 
to the destination depending on the availability probability of 
the relays. Besides, we can observe the robustness of our 
scheme as the network grows, while the efficiency of the 
greedy scheme drops for large user populations. By applying a 
K-scheduling pattern, we keep interference under control. The 
highest interference levels come from the first tier of 
interfering users as shown in Fig. 1, and therefore increasing 
network size does not significantly increase overall 
interference. We can also see that, for b=1, efficiency increases 
slightly with N. This is because we are increasing the length of 
the relaying routes, which is especially critical when there is 
just one channel available. For a fair comparison, we also 
show the performance of our scheme when there is no PU 
return, as considered in the greedy scheme. As expected, an 
additional increase in efficiency is also seen. 
Next, we compare our i-JBiT algorithm, which has been 
proved to be truthful, with a reinforcement learning-based 
bidding algorithm. There are a number of works that consider 
reinforcement learning (RL) for spectrum allocation [21], [22]. 
In our paper, RL is used to develop a bidding algorithm that 
enables the SUs to revise their bids (and truthful/untruthful 
behavior) based on previous experience. 
We establish two different fixed values of β: one for the 
truthful bid (βt) and another smaller one for the untruthful bid 
(βu < βt). Therefore, in an attempt to improve its utility, an SU 
must decide which action to take, since there is a tradeoff 
between obtaining resources (using a higher  β) and  increasing 
utility (using a smaller β). For this purpose, we endow SUs 
with learning capabilities. The value of θ is updated as in (12). 
We denote the probabilities that the SU source m will bid 
truthfully or untruthfully as pm,t and pm,u, respectively. Each SU 
updates both probabilities individually using the Learning 
Automata algorithm [23]. For example, suppose that a user 
obtained a higher utility by using βu, then the probabilities will 
be updated as  
, , ,
, ,
( 1) ( ) + ·(1  ( ))                            (18a)
( 1) ( )  (1 )                                         (18b)
m u m u m u
m t m t
p t p t p t
p t p t


  
   
 
where 0 < δ < 1 is a step size parameter. Algorithm 4 describes 
the bidding process. SU agents update their actions following 
an iterative process, which involves bidding and learning.  
 
Algorithm 4 Reinforcement learning-based auction. 
1. Input: β 
2. for j = 1 : Number_of_Iterations do  
3.     [U, a]=bidding(β) 
4.     for m = 1 : N 
5.        if used_Both_Actions() then 
6.          [ pm,t , pm,u ] = update_Learning_Probabilities(am, Um) 
7.          βm = choose_Action( pm,t , pm,u ) 
8.         end 
9.     end 
10. end 
 
We consider two scenarios in order to study how learning 
affects the bidding process and we also study the process from 
a user perspective. In the first scenario, the QoS requirements 
of the users in ring 1, τmax,1, are more restrictive than those for 
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the users in rings 2, 3 and 4 (i.e., τmax,4 > τmax,3 > τmax,2 > τmax,1). 
To achieve this QoS, we consider that all users bid for the 
same number of channels (bm = 3). As result, users in ring 1 
place a much higher value on the resources than those in the 
other rings. We set the truthful and untruthful cost percentages 
to βt = 0.04 and βt > βu = 0.02, respectively. Note that the value 
of βu was chosen to be significantly lower than βt to show the 
effects of untruthful bidding. The number of iterations needed 
for the learning process to converge is less than 100.  
Figure 14 shows the utility per user Um after the learning 
process. Subcell indexes 1-6 correspond to the users from the 
first ring, 7-18 to the users from the second ring, 19-36 to the 
users from the third ring and the rest to the users from the 
fourth ring. The simulations indicate that in this scenario a 
relatively small fraction of the users (approximately 1/3) can 
afford the resources. These users are located in the first and 
second rings around the BS. We observed that users in the first 
ring learn that using βu is the best option. This is because, by 
using βu rather than βt, they increase their utility and still bid 
high enough to obtain the resources. In the second ring, their 
valuation of resources is lower, so they learn that, in order to 
improve their utility, they need to bid using βt. By using a 
smaller value, they will not obtain the resources and, therefore, 
their utility will be zero. Finally, for the last two rings, we see 
that, regardless of the percentage β chosen, users will always 
obtain Um = 0. This is because their valuation of resources is 
insufficient to win. Thus, in scenarios with misbalanced 
competition, a reinforcement learning-based bidding algorithm 
cannot guarantee truthfulness.  
In the second scenario, the competition among users is more 
balanced. We assume that users require similar QoS and thus, 
users from different rings will demand different numbers of 
channels. In particular, we set the number of channels to bm = 1 
for users in the first ring, bm = 2 for users in the second ring,  
bm = 3 for users in the third ring and, finally,  bm = 7 for users 
in the last ring. The truthful and untruthful cost percentages 
were set to βt = 0.02 and βu = 0.01, respectively. Figure 15 
shows the utility per user Um after the learning process. We can 
see that, in this case, the users in the first ring do not value the 
resources highly enough to be able to compete for them. 
However, the users in the other rings learn that they can 
increase their utility by using βt. In Fig. 16, we show how the 
percentages of truthful and untruthful bidders evolve through 
iterations of the learning process. As this scenario allows fairer 
competition among rings, the percentage of users that bid 
truthfully increases. In a real network, users will have 
heterogeneous valuations of resources, so auction mechanisms 
such as i-JBiT should be applied to ensure truthfulness.  
VII. RELATED WORK 
Recently, multi-hop cellular networks (MC2N) have 
attracted a lot of attention due to their potential to achieve 
efficient spectrum usage by exploiting local available channels 
and support dynamic traffic distributions without additional 
infrastructure costs [24], [25]. Most auction applications in 
MC2N are incorporated for routing rather than spectrum 
allocation purposes [26]-[27]. To exploit the full potential of 
MC2N, bidding strategies for spectrum allocation, route 
selection and relaying incentives should be jointly considered.  
Designing auction mechanisms for MC2N that consider QoS 
is a challenging task as the process involves bidding for 
multiple channels. The few works which consider spectrum 
auction in multi-hop networks [12], [13] assume that users bid 
for a single channel, and ignore SU QoS requirements. 
Heterogeneous demands in spectrum auctions have been 
considered for single-hop networks in [15]-[16] and [28]-[29]. 
In [28] a QoS-aware auction framework is developed for 
bidders to dynamically bid for primary or secondary users 
rights according to their QoS demands. A multi-channel 
auction scheme is presented in [29] to satisfy heterogeneous 
SU demands in terms of number of requested channels. The 
auction scheme is based on a combinatorial auction which is 
computationally complex and channel reuse is not considered. 
In [15], [16], an auction framework for spectrum group buying 
is presented where buyers are voluntarily grouped together to 
acquire and share the spectrum band sold in the auction. 
However, even though in this case buyers bid for multiple 
channels, they will only win one channel and the main purpose 
of these schemes is to obtain resources at a lower price. Our 
partition-based auction schemes, in addition to providing 
group discounts, allow the partitioning of users based on their 
QoS requirements, thereby ensuring a fair distribution of 
resources. Despite being multi-item auctions, our schemes are 
truthful, incentive compatible and computationally efficient. 
This last property is highly desirable for auctions in multi-hop 
networks. 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper presents a new concept of spectrum auction in 
multi-hop cognitive cellular networks (MC2Ns). First, a joint 
bidding and tipping scheme is developed to iteratively revise 
bidding and tipping strategies. Based on the clearing price set 
by the auctioneer and the incentive needed to encourage the 
relays to cooperate, SUs decide the number of resources 
needed to satisfy their QoS requirements in the most profitable 
way. Then, group partitioning-based auction schemes are 
presented together with new winner selection and payment 
mechanisms to exploit the heterogeneous QoS demands of 
SUs.  
An extensive set of simulation results is provided to 
evaluate different schemes. Simulation results have shown that 
for highly demanding users, compared with the no-group 
scheme, the static group scheme provides 3 times higher 
revenue for the PO and 150% more winners with a consequent 
increase in social welfare. For low-demanding users, the PO 
can keep a similar revenue with the dynamic scheme by 
lowering the price per channel by 50% as the number of 
winners will increase proportionally. We also show that our i-
JBiT scheme outperforms other schemes for strategy revision 
based on reinforcement learning and is truthful, incentive 
compatible and computationally efficient. As a byproduct, our 
model, which integrates a route discovery protocol, allows for 
tractable analysis and is more robust than other models when 
large populations of bidders are considered.  
APPENDIX A: PROOF OF PROPERTIES FOR i-JBiT SCHEME  
1) Proof of Theorem 1 (Truthfulness): This proof follows from 
[13] and [31]. Nevertheless, we decided to include it for sake 
of completeness. To prove the truthfulness of the i-JBiT 
scheme we first show that the resources are monotonically 
allocated and winners are charged with critical value. 
Definition 1: Monotonic allocation: When the bidding 
strategies of other users β-m are fixed, if user m wins the 
auction by bidding ( )m mbid  , then it will also win by bidding 
( ') ( )m m m mbid bid  . 
Definition 2: Critical value: The critical value is such that if 
the user bids higher than that, it wins and otherwise, it loses.  
Lemma 1: The auction resources, i.e., channels, are 
monotonically allocated in our i-JBiT scheme.  
Proof: The i-JBiT scheme determines that ( )m mbid   is a 
winning bid when ( )m m qbid price  . Thus, if 
( ') ( )m m m mbid bid  then ( ')m mbid   is also a winning bid. 
Lemma 2: The clearing price of the i-JBiT scheme, 
qprice , is 
a critical value.  
Proof: Since user m wins the auction when 
( )m m qbid price  , this lemma directly follows. Besides, if 
user m wins the auction by bidding ( )m mbid   and ( ')m mbid  , 
then the payment 
qprice  is the same for both.  
  Using the previous claims, let us prove the truthfulness of i-
JBiT. We prove that if the best bidding strategy of user m is 
m , following a strategy 'm , 'm m   results in 
( ') ( )m m m mU U  . The following cases are possible: 
- If user m places a bid ( ') ( )m m m mbid bid   with 
( ')m m qbid price  , then according to Lemma 1 and 2, m is 
charged the same price and thus,  ( ') ( )m m m mU U  . Our 
claim holds. 
- If user m places a bid ( ') ( )m m m mbid bid   with 
( ')m m qbid price  , then according to Lemma 1 and 2, m will 
loss and its utility is zero ( ( ') 0m mU   ). Our claim holds. 
- If user m places a bid ( ') ( )m m m mbid bid   with 
( ')m m qbid price  , then according to Lemma 1 and 2, m is 
charged the same price and thus,  ( ') ( )m m m mU U  . Our 
claim holds. 
- If user m places a bid ( ') ( )m m m mbid bid   with 
( ')m m qbid price  , then m  cannot be the best bidding 
strategy of user m and thus, this case is not possible.  
Hence, a user cannot improve its utility by submitting a bid 
different from its true bid and we can conclude that i-JBiT is 
truthful.                                                                                     ■ 
2) Proof of Theorem 2 (Individual rationality): Since the bids 
are sorted in decreasing order, 
1 1( ) ( )m m m mbid bid    and 
the price is determined as 
q lprice bid , where lbid  is the 
highest loosing bid, 
lbid  < 1mbid   then, qprice   1mbid   
mbid . We can conclude that i-JBiT is individually rational 
since any user k will not pay more than its bid.                        ■ 
3) Proof of Theorem 3 (Computational efficiency): We analyze 
the running time of i-JBiT. Winner selection (identifying and 
ordering highest bids) takes O(log N) steps. In the worst case, 
the process is repeated T times and then, M winners are 
selected, which takes O(TM log N) steps. When the users 
revise their strategies, they need to solve problem (10), which 
is a convex problem and can be solved in polynomial time 
[30]. Consequently, the overhead is acceptable. 
APPENDIX B: PROOF OF PROPERTIES OF i-JBiT SGROUP SCHEME 
(THEOREM 4) 
1) Proof of Truthfulness: The proof of truthfulness of the i-
JBiT sgroup scheme can be easily derived from the proof for 
the i-JBiT scheme considering a strategy per group 
1 2{ , ,..., }s ns     and assuming that one of the users (e.g., 
user m = 1) chooses a strategy, 
1 1'  , which results in 
strategy 
1 2' { ', ,..., }s ns    . The same reasoning applies for 
any other user or for situations in which several users 
simultaneously change strategies. The winning strategy 
s  is 
such that ( )s s qprice  . The details are omitted due to 
space constraints.                                                                      ■ 
2) Proof of Individual rationality: Let us denote by 
s  a 
winning group bid obtained as 
,
s
s m sm
bid

  . According 
to the winner selection and payment scheme, the clearing price 
is  q l sprice s     , where l  is the highest losing group 
bid. The price of each user m in the winning group s is given 
by ,
,
m s
m s q
s
bid
price price

, and thus 
, ,m s m sprice bid . We 
can conclude that the i-JBiT sgroup scheme is individually 
rational since any user m will not pay more than its bid.          ■ 
3) Computational efficiency: We analyze the running time of 
the i-JBiT sgroup. Winner selection (grouping and ordering) 
takes O(NK log S) steps. In the worst case, the process is 
repeated T times which takes O(TNK log S) steps. When the 
users revise their bids, they need to solve problem (10), which 
is a convex problem and can be solved in polynomial time 
[30]. Finally, if there are ns winning users per group S, to 
obtain the bid per user renders an overall complexity of 
O(TNK log S + Sns). Consequently, although the grouping 
adds additional complexity the overhead is still acceptable. 
APPENDIX C: PROOF OF PROPERTIES FOR DGROUP SCHEME 
(THEOREM 5)  
1) Proof of Truthfulness: Following the price set up of the 
dgroup scheme given in (16), if 
m  is the winning bidding 
strategy, then ( ) ( )m m c mbid price t  . If the user bids with 
another strategy  'm m   such that, ( ')m mbid    ( )c mprice t , 
then ( ') 0mU   . Thus, a user cannot improve its utility by 
placing other than its true bid and we can conclude that dgroup 
is truthful.                                                              ■ 
2) Proof of individual rationality: The dgroup scheme uses a 
decreasing pricing mechanism. If the user bids successfully at 
time tm, ( ) ( )m m c mbid price t  , it will also win at time T as 
the price decreases in time and with the number of bidders 
(16). Hence, ( ) ( )m m cbid price T   and we can conclude that 
dgroup is individually rational since any user m will not pay 
more than its bid.                                                                      ■ 
3) Computational efficiency: The computational 
complexity of the dgroup scheme is the lowest of the three 
schemes. The winner and payment calculation takes O(nf ·N) 
steps. The user bid is obtained by solving problem (10), which 
is a convex problem and can be solved in polynomial time 
[30]. Consequently, the overhead is acceptable. 
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